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Consciousness is typically construed as being explainable purely in terms of either private, raw 
feels or higher-order, reflective representations. In contrast to this false dichotomy, we propose a 
new view of consciousness as an interactive, plastic phenomenon open to sociocultural influence. 
We take up our account of consciousness from the observation of radical cortical neuroplasticity 
in human development. Accordingly, we draw upon recent research on macroscopic neural 
networks, including the “default mode, ” to illustrate cases in which an individual’s particular 
“connectome” is shaped by encultured social practices that depend upon and influence 
phenomenal and reflective consciousness. On our account, the dynamically interacting 
connectivity of these networks bring about important individual differences in conscious 
experience and determine what is “present” in consciousness. Further, we argue that the 
organization of the brain into discrete anti-correlated networks supports the phenomenological 
distinction of prereflective and reflective consciousness, but we emphasize that this finding 
must be interpreted in light of the dynamic, category-resistant nature of consciousness. Our 
account motivates philosophical and empirical hypotheses regarding the appropriate time-
scale and function of neuroplastic adaptation, the relation of high and low-frequency neural 
activity to consciousness and cognitive plasticity, and the role of ritual social practices in neural 
development and cognitive function.
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like to construct an account of mental life grounded by the basic 
insight that cognition is primarily embodied and embedded within 
an organized environment and social field rather than detached 
and spectatorial (Stern, 2009). Second, in light of recent evidence 
of the brain’s radical, multisensory plasticity, we will argue that this 
profound adaptivity at the molecular, network, and systems levels 
underlies the development and intersubjective function of human 
consciousness. We will thus argue that both the long-term plastic-
ity underlying skill development and cultural learning and “fast” 
sensory–motor plasticity underpin our conscious experience of 
the world and ourselves. Indeed, there are physiological reasons to 
suspect that both “primary” prereflective processing1 and “second-
ary” reflective processing are both dynamic and flexible in nature, 
grounded in the actual history of the system’s encounter with the 
environment. Whether we are discussing neuron recycling underly-
ing memory consolidation, synaptic reorganization following limb 
amputation, or alterations in the particular communicative balance 
between macroscopic neural networks, the old tropes of radical 
modularism and localization of function are no longer tenable.
Of course, any account of plasticity must face the unique chal-
lenge of explaining both “stop” and “go” mechanisms, i.e., the 
accelerators and “brakes” of cognitive development. While the 
human brain demonstrates profound plasticity in many domains, 
it is also the case that two individuals, ceteris paribus, will likely 
IntroductIon
A constant theme in cognitive science is to define the explanan-
dum of consciousness in terms of qualia or “phenomenal feels,” 
i.e., some ineffable, subjective “what-it-is-like” to experience the 
world. Moreover, it is often argued that consciousness requires 
either some kind of higher-order metarepresentation of first-order 
states (Gennaro, 2004) or that consciousness is itself localized to 
the pure phenomenal feels or “what-it-is-like” (Dretske, 1993). We 
contend that the prevailing theoretical spectrum begins from the 
incorrect assumption that both phenomenal feels and higher-order 
representations can be collapsed into a single phenomenon. In con-
trast, we argue that the qualities of phenomenal experience and a 
subject’s higher-order representations of those qualities are separate 
explananda, while still contending that higher-order representations 
significantly change the “what-it-is-like” of human experience. This 
is in accordance with our thesis that reflective consciousness is 
something that develops in ontogeny and depends upon the plastic 
individual development of the sensorimotor system in interaction 
with the default mode network (DMN). Moreover, we contend that 
both phenomena are highly complex, reciprocally interact, and 
depend upon the organisms phylogenetic and ontogenetic history 
of structural coupling between body, brain, and culture.
What drives us to this conclusion? First, the phenomenological 
tradition, as exemplified by the work of Martin Heidegger and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, emphasizes that our experience of the 
world is primarily prereflective in nature. Accordingly, we would 
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he can resist, decide not to consider stimuli, see them under 
a different viewpoint, etc. Thus our brain–body systems have 
evolved to maximize the interaction of reflective and prereflective 
processes, as well as their interaction and embeddedness within 
a cultural–intersubjective field. Indeed it is often the case that 
learned culture and intersubjectivity are themselves the innate 
control factors restricting our development in particular ways, 
with examples ranging from “background” factors of social value 
(race, class, etc.) to the culturally-specific “rules of engagement” 
for everyday conversation.
Furthermore, we contend that human adults typically engage 
with the world of objects at a high level of abstraction and linguistic 
categorization. We are, as Dennett (1993) says, spiders constantly 
and instinctively spinning our experience into narrative webs that 
filter and constrain our sensory dynamics. Narrative elaboration 
appears to be both habitual and open to training at the neural 
level (Farb et al., 2007). Within eastern traditions, it is common to 
describe the subject as one who cannot help but assign narrative 
evaluations to the world of sensory-chaos.
In this paper we develop an account of consciousness that 
embodies the basic insight that our primary subjective engage-
ment with the world is not constituted by the formal propositional 
reasoning of Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI), 
otherwise known as the sense-represent-plan-act model (Wheeler, 
2007). However, we do not deny that there are constants in both 
the primary and secondary processes or that representations play 
a critical role in cognition and reflective consciousness. Rather, 
we follow Clark’s suggestion that a mature science of mind must 
invoke both representational information processing and notions 
of  emergent  sensorimotor  and  cultural  dynamics  (Clark  and 
Toribio, 1994; Clark, 2003, 2008). A variety of phylogenetic fac-
tors ensure that through the “cloud” of sensory–motor disorder, 
certain variables remain more or less constant and transferable 
within the community by means of joint-attention, abstraction, 
and categorization.
We will argue that this basic intersubjectivity is critical for 
human development and underlies our most basic modes of social 
attunement. Indeed, when discussing the “breaks” on plasticity, it 
is worth noting that intersubjective practices play a primary role in 
delimiting an individuals’ progress through life. On our account, 
intersubjectivity is a primary motivating factor for learning through 
joint action, and depends crucially upon the radically neuroplastic 
nature of our social-cognitive capacities. Furthermore, we argue 
that embodied world-directedness and sociocultural cognition are 
reciprocally related. Research suggests that attending to external 
stimuli may actively inhibit the kinds of reflective, higher-order 
thought posited in so-called “theater models” of consciousness 
(Baars, 1997; Fox et al., 2009).
Accordingly,  we  contend  that  recent  research  on  the  gross 
functional connectivity of the human brain sheds light on the 
problem  of  understanding  both  phenomenal  feels  and  meta-
consciousness. This new paradigm underlines the importance 
of  ontogenetic  plasticity  and  social–cultural  development  for 
determining “what-it-is-like” to be human. We will thus argue 
that the intrinsic connectivity of the human brain, particularly 
its organization into discrete anti-correlated networks, supports 
a view of reflective consciousness as a sociocultural cognitive 
develop with visual, motor, and auditory cortices in roughly the 
same place with roughly the same function. Indeed, in many cases, 
the   function of radical neuroplasticity may be a kind of gam-
bler’s bargain, in which multiple avenues to reproductive success 
are made available via profound neural plasticity. Any successful 
account of consciousness must demonstrate how the brain both 
adapts to and resists profound environmental, biological, and 
sociocultural changes.
What is the alternative to the radical representational model 
or pure sensory–motor account? What kind of system could cope 
with changing environmental demands with functionally specific 
responses? “A functional system of this sort would be based on 
a dynamic process aimed at achieving an invariant result across 
changing circumstances” (Reed, 1996, p. 72). On the picture we are 
endorsing, we must assume that the organism is dynamically reac-
tive from the very beginning of its ontogenetic history in virtue of 
autonomous, self-organizing animacy, what Julian Jaynes called 
behavioral reactivity. Interactively learned reflective capacities then 
further enhance our capacities for action and consciousness while 
receiving a great deal of inheritance from sensory–motor practice 
and the phylogeny of the organism.
The role of the neural system then is to coordinate or regulate 
the animal’s encounter so as to effectively utilize the resources of 
a changing environment by means of adaptive behavior. On this 
view, evolution acts upon the distributed functional system, leading 
to adaptive behavior units across a nested set of spatial–temporal 
scales. Of course, there could not have been cultural evolution if 
humans had not been able, for example, to see “fire” as something 
“useful” instead of something that only frightened them. The plas-
ticity of the human mind subserves not only our ability to adapt 
in the face of shifting challenges, but also to resist them at times, 
putting the “breaks” on development in order to build individual 
and collective cognitive “niches.” Thus our eventual mastery of fire 
and other potent environment and mind-shaping tools opened up 
a world of new biological and cultural stimulants (e.g., nutrients, 
shelter, bone tools, and hunting rituals) that furthered our particu-
lar evolutionary development
2.
This leads to a “transition from models of representation as 
mirroring or encoding to models of representation as control” 
(Clark, 1997, p. 47). As Maturana and Varela put it, the pat-
terns of brain activity are not symbolic representations standing 
in for the stimulus, but rather, state transitions induced by the 
perturbations or triggering effects of the ecological informa-
tion embedded within the stimulus. In other words, “Stimuli 
act  upon  the  organism  as  control  parameters,  which  upon 
reaching a certain critical threshold induce a global qualitative 
discontinuity in the organism (a bifurcation in phase space)” 
(Thompson, 2007, p. 69). This radical and transitory plasticity 
of processing is contrasted by the elements of human change 
that are also partly determined by our own innate biology (e.g., 
homeostasis, survival instincts), as well as acquired and subjec-
tive values (ethical, cultural, religious, etc.). Moreover, a human 
being does not always change. Sometimes (or even many times) 
2 Our account thus shares several features with other social–cultural accounts of the 
ontogeny and functioning of consciousness, see Donald (2001) or Steinberg (2006) 
for representationally or culturally weighted accounts, respectively.www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 20  |  3
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  control mechanism,   motivating cortical adaptation and helping to 
  shoehorn individuals into their particular social-cognitive “niche.” 
Delimiting the functional role of the task-negative and positive 
networks is a step forward in understanding the brain’s large-scale 
organization, and as this special issue suggests, it is not clear why 
something supervening on a dynamic substrate would not itself 
be dynamic in nature.
What Is the explanada of conscIousness?
Theorists are divided about the need to rigorously define the 
concept of consciousness before scientifically explaining it as a 
natural phenomenon. Some, like Koch (2004), think that “Until 
the problem is better understood, a more formal definition of 
consciousness is likely to be either misleading or overly restrictive, 
or both” (p. 12). Others, like Julian Jaynes, argue “We first have to 
start from the top, from some conception of what consciousness 
is, from what our own introspection is. We have to be sure of that, 
before we can enter the nervous system and talk about its neurol-
ogy” (p. 18). Because the first approach is bound to improperly 
delimit the explanandum and thus prove explanatorily evasive, 
we will follow Jaynes in emphasizing the importance of phenom-
enologically driven definitions as a mutual constraint on scien-
tific explanation3. It is our contention that an empirically sound 
and phenomenologically driven approach to cognition and con-
sciousness will allow us to begin explaining the enigmatic nature 
of human subjectivity rather than explaining it away. Moreover, 
coming to terms with phenomenal experience is at the heart of 
the solving the mind–body problem and other issues related to 
the naturalization of subjectivity.
First off, we contend that it is necessary to develop an adequate 
mental taxonomy of reflective and prereflective experience before 
attempting naturalistic explanation of such phenomena. Mental 
taxonomies that distinguish between different levels of conscious-
ness are important because they allow us to trace the phylogenetic 
and ontogenetic trajectory of reflective consciousness in relation 
to purely prereflective mentalities such as those driven solely by 
instinct, perceptual learning, and habit. Mental taxonomies come 
at a price, however, freezing a shifting phenomena into a static 
form. Thus we strive to denote specific situations in which alter-
native functional substrates swap between the “top” and “bottom” 
position depending upon the context and demands of any given 
situation (see Table 1, below). Even in this formulation it is clear 
that our innate tendency to explain consciousness in spatial, rather 
than with temporal or biodynamic metaphors, can be misleading. 
What sense does it make, for example, to explain conscious control 
solely in terms of top-down and/or bottom-up processes if both 
are in reciprocal relation with “bottom” intersubjectivity and “top” 
executive thought-elements? Before investigating dynamic inter-
relations of these functional processes, we first distinguish between 
roughly two different types of mentality in order to better delimit 
these substrata: those driven purely by prereflective reactivity and 
those driven by this plus reflective consciousness4.
Phenomenological reflection indicates that disengaged contem-
plation of the world’s sensory richness is not the foundation of 
our consciousness. Rather we are typically enacting a phenomenal 
world that is both shifting and stable in nature. Individuals across 
cultures share a remarkable degree of perceptual and intersubjec-
tive features, yet also display a profound individualism between one 
another. Thus the challenge for any sociocultural or neurodynamic 
account of consciousness is to situate our profound adaptivity with 
our innate phylogenetic inheritance. Thus we observe that across 
cultures, evolution produces human beings with highly similar gross 
neuroanatomy, basic perceptual constraints, rearing practices, and 
Table 1 | Qualitative differences between prereflective and reflective consciousness, and their interaction.
General characteristics Role of plasticity Time-scale of 
operation
“What-it-is-like” Inherits features 
primarily from
PR Innate, automatic, 
embodied, habitual, 
resistant to 
perturbations, “online”
Rapid synaptic turn-over, 
functional adaptation, major 
development 0–4 years
Short (milliseconds) Autopilot, flow, seamless, 
external absorption, effortless, 
intuitive, extended through 
tools and the body
Phylogeny
R Partially learned, socially 
embedded, can be 
arrested, sensitive to 
intersubjectivity, 
“offline”
Learned Behavior; individual 
differences, alteration of 
macroscopic connectome. 
Major development 
4–20 years, throughout life
Long (seconds, 
minutes, even days 
and years)
Narrotological, reflective, 
action-controlling, detached, 
interiority, folk psychological, 
calculative, deliberate
Ontogeny
PR × R Intersubjective 
interaction, individual 
differences in perception 
and cognition. Neither 
“offline” nor “online. ” 
Structures PR and R 
(“pre-noetic”)
Influence of local field 
potentials on global 
connectivity, rest-stimulus 
interaction. Develops from 
birth on
Variable; integration 
of experience with 
self-narrative, 
influence of culture 
on perception
Smooth expertise without 
zoning out, integration 
between online and offline 
cognition
Both
3 See Varela et al. (1991).
4 Hobson (2009), Lycan (1997), Schooler (2002), Armstrong (1997), Dewey (1958), 
and James (1950) all make a distinction along similar lines.Frontiers in Psychology  | Consciousness Research    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 20  |  4
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ontogenetic development. Yet we must also explain the radical plas-
ticity that has enabled humanity to thrive in the face of drastic 
environmental and cultural–technological shifts5. Thus we are able 
to shift processing from one cortical area to another given minor 
brain injury or sensory deprivation (Bavelier and Neville, 2002), or 
retool motion tracking areas for visual word-perception through 
acquisition of literacy (Dehaene et al., 2010). Moreover, when distin-
guishing prereflective and reflective consciousness, Merleau-Ponty 
at times emphasized the dependence of the former on the latter:
The sensible quality, far from being coextensive with perception, 
is the peculiar product of an attitude of curiosity or observation. 
It appears when, instead of yielding the whole gaze to the world, I 
turn toward the gaze itself, and when I ask myself what precisely it 
is I see. (Merleau-Ponty, 2006, p. 263)6
In some cases, my meta-reflective capacities fundamentally inform 
my basic experience of the world. We find in other places, also, rich 
examples where my reflective goals and intentions pre-noetically 
structure what is present in my lived practice, as when Merleau-
Ponty describes the footballer in action:
The field is not given to him, but present as the immanent term of 
his practical intentions; the player becomes one with it and feels 
the direction of the “goal,” for example, just as immediately as the 
vertical and the horizontal planes of his own body. (Merleau-Ponty, 
2006, p.169)
Thus, although prereflective reactivity in adult humans is often 
characterized by subpersonal, task-driven “flow” states7 in which 
reflective consciousness recedes into the background, we can also 
find cases in which these states are profoundly impacted by or even 
co-occur with reflective processes. Julian Jaynes details a comple-
mentary case, in which the prereflective engagement actively co-
occurs with a detached reflective process:
My hand, foot, and head behavior...are almost in a different world. 
In touching something, I am touched; in turning my head, the world 
turns to me; in seeing, I am related to a world I immediately obey in 
the sense of driving on the road and not on the sidewalk. And I am not 
[reflectively] conscious of any of this. And certainly not logical about 
it. I am caught up, unconsciously enthralled, if you will, in a total 
interacting reciprocity of stimulation that may be constantly threaten-
ing or comforting, appealing or repelling, responding to the changes 
in traffic and particular aspects of it with trepidation or confidence, 
trust or distrust, while my [narrative] consciousness is still off on other 
topics. (Jaynes, 2000, p. 85, bracketed comments and italics added)
These “zombie” skills suggest that our cognitive system can automat-
ically carry out intentions without the need for meta-conscious over-
sight, while also demonstrating the subtle dynamics of   embedding 
“top” reflective intentions within active practice. The point is not 
that automobile drivers are asleep while they drive. Rather, the driver 
often steers automatically while his or her reflectively conscious 
mind is ruminating on something else. Thus, their prior and ongoing 
reflective intentions structure and guide their experience of driv-
ing. Similarly, we can see how intersubjective, prereflective elements 
structure the reflective observation of and interaction with a tool 
(as in Heidegger), or in Husserl’s famous comparison of the first 
experiences of a Scandic anthropologist in Greenland and those of a 
naïve tourist. We literally “see intentions” and “experience thoughts” 
and these explanada are intimately interwoven within one another.
Furthermore, prereflective reactivity is subjective, and through 
development  and  interaction  comes  to  be  structured  by  the 
  cultural–linguistic constructs such as the self, the mind, and other 
folk psychological narratives (Hutto, 2008). We argue that the con-
ceptual categorization afforded by self-reflective folk psychological 
narratives greatly enhance our capacity for self-reflective action 
within an internal “mind-space.” We thus agree with accounts of 
language as a form of highly evolved tool use or extended cognition 
(Tylen et al., 2010). As Andy Clark argues,
“[T]hinking about thinking” is a good candidate for a distinctively 
human capacity – one not evidently shared by the non-language 
using animals that share our planet. Thus, it is natural to wonder 
whether this might be an entire species of thought in which lan-
guage plays the generative role – a species of thought that is not just 
reflected in (or extended by) our use of words but is directly depend-
ent on language for its very existence. (Clark, 1997, p. 209)8
In contrast to a continual absorption in realtime temporal dynamics, 
average human adults with “narratively driven” metacognition are 
capable of going “offline” to engage in lingual thought-  monitoring, 
deliberative thinking/moral judgment, conscious impulse control, 
self-consciousness (thoughts about self-image, future, past, etc.), 
daydreaming, abstract problem solving, reconstructive imagination 
(visual imagery, internal sketchpad), subvocal rehearsal, rumination, 
etc. Self-reflexive “ego functions” such as these have been studied 
by psychologists for decades under headings such as inner speech 
(Morin, 2005), working memory, thought-monitoring (Frith, 2005), 
and more recently, mind-wandering (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; 
Christoff et al., 2009). From this point forward, we will reserve the 
term “reflective consciousness” for such offline, decoupled activity. 
This is done to preserve the phenomenological distinction between 
low-level sensorimotor cognition and higher-order narrative-driven 
consciousness. We keep this strong distinction to primarily aid their 
modeling as dynamic interacting phenomena, not to suggest a fun-
damental separation or antagonism of their function. Although we 
review evidence that there exists a fundamental anti-correlation 
between the neural substrates of online and offline processing, we 
examine evidence that the strong hypothesis of “pure anti-correla-
tion” is unlikely. Ultimately, we aim to show that while this distinc-
tion is useful, it is the dynamic interaction of reflection and action 
that primarily underpins human consciousness.
5 See for example, cases in which an innate function such as  basic auditory pro-
cessing may migrate to or co-opt visual processing areas or even vision itself given 
brain damage (see Bavelier and Neville, 2002 for review) or a consistent alteration 
in a sensory–motor association (Shimojo and Nakajima, 1981).
6 On our interpretation, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “sensible quality” is more than 
just a pure phenomenal quality, but rather, refers to the quality of what-it-is-like to 
reflect on the sensory stream from a detached perspective.
7 i.e.,  those  states  typical  of  automatically  executed  instincts,  habits,  and  skills 
(Dreyfus, 2002).
8 Accordingly, we believe that unless you are engaging in second-order dynamics, 
you are not reflectively conscious at that moment. This is not to suggest that we 
are somehow asleep when we are not self-reflexive. It just means that there is a 
qualitative difference between phenomenal feelings and metacognitive reflection 
on phenomenal feelings.www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 20  |  5
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is not a Physical Symbol System, but rather, a dynamic, behaviorally 
reactive and recursive network of sensorimotor connectivity. On this 
perspective, the system conserves computational energy by using the 
actual world as a kind of “external memory source” (O’Regan, 1992) 
to be consulted on-the-fly in response to realtime information needs. 
As Rodney Brooks famously put it, “It turns out to be better to use 
the world as its own model” (Brooks, 1991, p. 139).
This has an important upshot for deflating the mind/body 
problem in regards to how “inner” experience corresponds to an 
“external world.” Strictly speaking, dynamics systems theory claims 
that for the prereflective system there is no epistemological (or 
experiential) distinction between “inner” and “outer” because the 
brain is not modeling the environment in low-level perceptual guid-
ance, but rather, responding to it in terms of its ontogenetic history 
of structural coupling as a brain–body system. As Maturana and 
Varela (1987) argued, simple surgical experiments on the ontoge-
netic development of control assemblies suggest that in regard to 
automatic, task-oriented behavior such as a frog catching prey 
“there is no such thing as up and down, front and back, in refer-
ence to an outside world, as it exists for the observer doing the study. 
There is only an internal correlation between the place where the 
retina receives a given perturbation and the muscular contractions 
that move the tongue, the mouth, the neck, and, in fact, the frog’s 
entire body” (Maturana and Varela, 1987, pp. 125–126) Accordingly, 
we can reject the Cartesian assumption that first-order behavioral 
dynamics depend on the sense-represent-plan-act model (Wheeler, 
2007). Instead, dynamic systems theory claims that
…intentions  are  [best]  seen  as  grounded  in  neural  patterns....
Decisions are precisely the brain’s falling into one pattern or another, 
a falling that is modeled as the settling into a basin of attraction 
that will constrain neural firing in a pattern. There is no linear 
causal chain of input, processing, and output. Instead there is a 
continual looping as sensory information feeds into an ongoing 
dynamic system, altering, or reinforcing pattern formation. (Protevi, 
2009, p. 18)11
Strictly speaking, the continual operation of first-order cogni-
tive dynamics is subpersonal and not conceptually structured by 
mentalistic metaphors such as the inside/outside, subject–object, 
mind–body schema (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999)12. In other 
words, primary prereflective processes are unaccompanied by meta-
cognitive reflection or the experience of a private “introcosm” or 
“theater” inside our heads13. Based on neuropsychological evidence, 
we argue that this inside/outside, subject–object schema operation-
alizes whenever we engage in “introspective gazing” or “reflection”14. 
reflectIve versus prereflectIve conscIousness
Perhaps the best way to understand the functional role of reflective 
consciousness in the human cognitive economy is to begin with its 
counterpart: the fast and efficient attention–salience reactivity sys-
tem. This vast and intricately connected coordination system has been 
investigated since the inception of psychology under the rubric of 
what William James called “automaton theory” and what was later to 
become taken up and refined as classic behaviorism under Watson and 
Skinner. In our own time, we have seen the rise of dynamic systems 
and 4EA theory9 as an explanatory model for how these automatic, 
subpersonal processes function so as to regulate our changing response 
to the environment. A rapidly growing body of research highlights a 
myriad of “cognitive” functions that are served or even dominated by 
everyday behavior, the body, intersubjective/interactive processes, and 
cultural forces. In many cases, these are underwritten by subpersonal 
body schemas that run automatically and without metarepresenta-
tional consciousness of their function10. One could say that our men-
tal landscape is pervaded by a prereflective consciousness regardless 
of whether reflective consciousness is totally absent, co-occurring, or 
intimately present in the action. Historically, some philosophers (e.g., 
Huxley) have argued that reflective consciousness as such is epiphe-
nomenal, an “inert spectator” that plays no causal role in the control 
architecture and can be compared to the steam of a train whistle.
One problem with this view is that it fails to explain the inverse 
relationship between reflective consciousness and action. As Julian 
Jaynes observed, “If [reflective] consciousness is the mere impo-
tent shadow of action, why is it more intense when action is most 
hesitant? And why are we least conscious when doing something 
most habitual?” (Jaynes, 2000, p. 11, bracketed comment added). 
Indeed, this question cannot be answered unless we acknowledge 
the phenomenological reality of effortless prereflective reactivity 
and the effortful deliberations of metacognitive control wherein 
behavior and attention is modulated by higher-order reflection 
and narratization. Prereflective flow states, wherein we are “lost” or 
“absorbed” in the moment of action, are ubiquitous among athletes 
and other experts who have honed and automatized their skills 
through continuous training. This training serves a dual purpose: 
first, to refine automatic processing schemas, second, to enable 
greater strategic control via adept representational and metarepre-
sentational thought. Thus the human phenomenon of flow is not 
all or nothing. Even in athletic flow, there are conscious, reflec-
tive thoughts and varying degrees of prereflective and reflective 
awareness of the body, the goal, the action, and so on. Indeed one 
could give examples in which one is wholly absorbed in a reflec-
tive thought, and it is likely that ritualistic mental–social training 
regimens such as sports and pedagogy are aimed at refining both 
levels of consciousness as well as their dynamic communication.
Prereflective cognitive processes depend upon ongoing structural 
transformations in the nervous system which give rise to both simple 
and complex behaviors across nested sets of temporal scales. According 
to the 4EA tradition in the philosophy of mind, these subpersonal per-
ception–action cycles are carried out without the use of explicit symbol 
tokens or “second-order” or “  metarepresentational” consciousness. 
This means that the prereflective, “first order”   sensorimotor network 
9 i.e., the “embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, affective” tradition.
10 See, for example, Gallagher (2005).
11 See Freeman (2005).
12 It is crucial to note that subpersonal cognition is still “subjective” insofar as there 
is something-it-is-like to experience first-order cognitive dynamics, but this subjec-
tivity is not structured by narrative consciousness and autobiographical memory.
13 Or hearts, solar plexus, or whatever other folk metaphor of the time might be in play.
14 Recent lines of research (see Clark (2008), ch. 3 for an overview) suggest the con-
struction of attentional objects such as our own thoughts and perceptions, as well 
as those of others, directly influences our reflective cognitive system, and vice-versa. 
Self-reflexive linguistic cognition grounded in lexical metaphors opens up the pos-
sibility for a psychological distance between ourselves and the immediate actions of 
our body that gives rise to novel modes of self-regulation based on the interaction 
between conscious narratization, imagination, executive control, and working  me-
mory (especially the episodic buffer).Frontiers in Psychology  | Consciousness Research    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 20  |  6
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Metaphorically speaking, reflective consciousness operationalizes15 
whenever we sharply focus our mind’s eye on experiential and 
sensory qualities rather than being mindlessly “absorbed” into the 
usability of affordances.
Our approach is thus similar to higher-order perception (HOP) 
and higher-order thought (HOT) theories. However, we differ sig-
nificantly insofar as we do not invoke higher-order representations 
to explain phenomenal feels, but rather, to explain narrative con-
sciousness and self-reflexive cognition. In contrast to higher-order 
theorists, we do not think higher-order representations are needed 
to explain phenomenal consciousness (the “what-it-is-like” of an 
organism). Instead, we think all organisms have a “what-it-is-like” 
insofar as they are living, embodied beings. However, we do con-
tend that higher-order representations change the what-it-is-like 
of human cognition to such an extent as to radically change the 
phenomenal qualities of experience, giving rise to new forms of 
narratological subjectivity.
Accordingly, we contend that this special psychological interior-
ity or “mind-space” does not correspond to a metaphysical sub-
stance (or ghostly process) as assumed by Cartesian dualists, but 
rather, to a virtual (i.e., temporary and easily dissoluble), analogi-
cally constructed “workspace” or “global theater” which acts as a 
“facility for accessing, disseminating, and exchanging information, 
and for exercising global coordination and control” (Baars, 1997, p. 
7). Focused introspection upon pure sensation by means of reflec-
tive consciousness is itself a metacognitive skill that fundamentally 
changes our “what-it-is-like,” uniting the dynamic sensory–motor 
processing with the profoundly cultural reflective lens. It is in these 
unique cases in which the vibrant individual differences in con-
sciousness and metacognition are most manifest. We thus contend 
that a dynamic systems approach coupled with well-established 
“theater models” of reflective consciousness gives reasoned answers 
to philosophical quandaries concerning qualia and subjectivity. 
Phenomenology  suggests  that  complete  absorption  into  task-
oriented, world-directed mental states is often unaccompanied by 
introspective thought-monitoring or autobiographical memory 
storage. Instead of being “self-present,” we often seem to be “away 
from ourselves” and “empty minded” when absorbed in the world 
at large.
Examples like the truck driver or trained meditation practitioner 
illustrate the oscillatory nature of self-other, reflective–prereflective 
processing networks. When absorbed in the world, we often find 
ourselves “coming back” from selfless states unaware of the tem-
poral gaps in consciousness. Indeed, “[narrative] consciousness 
knits itself over its time gaps and gives the illusion of continuity” 
(Jaynes, 2000, p. 25, bracketed comment added). Furthermore, 
research on change blindness suggests that we are often deluded 
about the level of detail available for report in our episodic memory. 
In reality, narrative consciousness is able to access only a fraction 
of what stirs beneath it
16. In other words, our reflective experience 
of perceptual detail is a top-down17, virtual construction based 
on   autobiographical memory. As Alva Noë puts it, “To experience 
detail virtually, you do not need to have all the detail in your head. 
All you need is quick and easy access to the relevant detail when 
you need it” (Noë, 2004, p. 50).
Nevertheless, we delude ourselves into thinking that we have 
a rich picture “inside” our heads when perceiving the world. We 
suggest that this is a side-effect of language turning experience 
itself into an object of understanding, amenable to folk psycho-
logical metaphors steeped with dualistic presuppositions about the 
continual presence of consciousness for the control of “rational” 
thought and action. Reflective consciousness seems to pervade our 
experience because our mental metaphors are structured by the 
concept of rational access and control, i.e., the “I.” Indeed, our entire 
autobiographical language is centered around a culture in which the 
ineffable “self” is both container and director of our experiences. 
But as Jaynes says, “[Narrative] consciousness is a much smaller 
part of our mental life than we are conscious of, because we cannot 
be conscious of what we are not conscious of” (Jaynes, 2000, p. 23, 
bracketed comment added). This limitation of access is built into 
the basic structure of conscious introspection, but it is not a burden. 
Rather, our ability to package prereflective states into increasingly 
complex  and  useful  representational  and  metarepresentational 
“tools” represents a decisive factor in our sudden departure from 
prelinguistic animals (Tylen et al., 2010).
We contend that appreciation of such facts suggests that the 
subjective experience of non-human animals is subjective in the 
same way that the empty mindedness of long distance truck driv-
ers is subjective. Although the truck driver may drive “mindlessly,” 
engaging only the basic sensorimotor subroutines needed to drive 
safely, it is her automatic conscious rumination that may remind 
her of an important forgotten task or keep her attention at the road 
regardless of her fatigue. The real trick then, is to understand how 
our reflective, linguistic consciousness of the world structures our 
prereflective engagement with the world. Without the possibility 
of making mental experience an explicit object of attention by 
means of a linguistic, self-reflexive “tag” with special experiential 
associations of interiority, most non-human animals are unable to 
create the necessary psychological distance from their actions to 
construct the reflective “introcosm” familiar to humans when they 
turn inwards upon the “hidden hermitage where we may study out 
the troubled book of what we have done and yet may do” (Jaynes, 
2000, p. 1).
As we have reviewed, an inspection of phenomenology reveals 
a few basic structural elements of both reflective and prereflec-
tive experience. Crucially, consciousness is both hierarchical and 
dynamic: we are not always reflective or prereflective in nature, 
but rather, constantly shifting between these poles of reference. 
In examining the kinds of cases explored by Merleau-Ponty and 
Heidegger, we are presented with examples in which particular 
actions or stances are mediated by corporeal states, prior intentions, 
future thinking, and present-oriented action. For humans moving 
through the world then, consciousness is not any one static state 
or achievement, but rather a coordinated movement through vari-
ous interrelated states of representation and dynamic world-body 
exchange. As we will show in the next section, the neurobiology of 
social interaction plays a crucial role in the development of these 
conscious capacities.
15 To operate literally means “to perform a function; to exert power or influence.” 
When consciousness operationalizes, it exerts influence over the rest of the brain. 
This is meant to indicate how consciousness is temporary and easily dissoluble.
16 See Wegner (2002).
17 Or better still, top-top (see Roepstorff and Frith, 2004).www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 20  |  7
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the neurophenomenology of socIocultural 
conscIousness
Does this phenomenological taxonomy have any grounding in 
cognitive neuroscience? Recently there has been a great deal of 
work examining the properties of macroscopic neural networks 
when subjects are left “task-free” in a brain-scanning environ-
ment (Raichle et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2009). These so-called “rest-
ing state” functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments 
(rsfMRI)  consistently  find  statistically  coherent  relationships 
within and between gross neuroanatomical networks that are 
correlated with, and anti-correlated with, a variety of functions 
relevant for the development and functioning of consciousness. 
These networks include the DMN, salience network (SAL), and 
central-executive network (CEN). As we will primarily focus on 
the function and anatomy of the DMN, it is helpful to briefly 
review the latter two networks.
Originally described simply as the “task-positive network,” atten-
tion system, or executive network, traditional, and rsfMRI have lead 
to the description of two independent but closely related exog-
enous neural networks. These are deemed “task-positive” due to 
their consistent tendency to activate during cognitively demanding 
tasks and deactivate at rest. The CEN refers to the top-down dorsal 
attention network associated with the online control of behavior, 
and includes the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, frontal eye fields, 
dorsal medial-prefrontal cortex (MPFC), intraparietal sulcus, and 
superior parietal lobule. The SAL refers to a more ventral net-
work of regions involved in the automatic the detection of error, 
somatosensory awareness, and the detection of salient non-target 
stimulus. The SAL network is made up of the dorsal anterior cingu-
late cortex, frontoinsular cortices, amygdala and ventral midbrain 
(Buckner and Vincent, 200718; Carhart-Harris and Friston, 201019). 
Collectively these networks show some degree of integration, both 
being anti-correlated with the DMN at rest, yet also retaining a 
significant degree of functional non-overlap.
To better understand the relevance of rsfMRI, let us briefly review 
its historical development. In the mid-1990s, during the initial devel-
opment and boom of social-cognitive neuroscience, researchers con-
sistently observed deactivations of the MPFC during “task-positive” 
conditions (Damoiseaux and Greicius, 2009; Fox et al., 2009). In other 
words, it appeared that whenever subjects were required to complete 
tasks requiring focused attention and continual cognitive-executive 
effort, the MPFC would deactivate. Early controversy revolved around 
whether this deactivation was merely relative to task-induced positive 
activations or a “true” deactivation of this area from baseline. In the 
decade since these early discoveries, a great body of neurophysiologi-
cal research has gone underway, revealing that these deactivations are 
not the product of relative activation ratios, but rather, are likely to 
reflect true task-  induced neurophysiological decoupling, interaction, 
and deactivation depending upon the nature of the task or resting 
“state” (Greicius and Menon, 2004; Esposito et al., 2006; Buckner and 
Vincent, 2007; Jerbi et al., 2010). Why are deactivations in the MPFC 
relevant for the study of both prereflective and reflective consciousness?
First, the MPFC has been implicated in particular types of mental 
representation (Frith and Frith, 2006), theory-of-mind (Frith, 2007), 
and narrative processing (Mar, 2004; Mano et al., 2009). The MPFC 
has long been implicated in social cognition tasks, and can be further 
subdivided into areas associated with   cognitive (posterior region of 
rostral MFC), affective (anterior rostral MFC), and task outcomes 
associated with punishment or reward (orbital MFC; Amodio and 
Frith, 2006). The MPFC is thus uniquely situated to mediate between 
top-down cognition and bottom-up reward-salience cues, and has 
been hypothesized as a necessary area for the representation of 
information in a conscious, socially communicable format (Frith 
and Frith, 2007). The MPFC remains highly plastic throughout 
childhood and adolescence, reaching biological maturity during 
late adolescence (Gogtay et al., 2004; Blakemore, 2008). Further, 
the development of theory-of-mind is considered a significant land-
mark in cognitive development that can be accelerated or inhibited 
by environmental factors (Jenkins and Astington, 1996).
Due to the prominent role of the DMN in these domains as well 
as within episodic memory, early researchers hypothesized that 
executive function tasks might require an inhibition of “stimulus-
irrelevant thoughts” (SITs) or mind-wandering. Simply put, given 
the boring nature of sitting prone within a magnet, experimental 
participants  might  naturally  engage  in  social-cognitive  mind- 
wandering between the rigorous experimental trials. As task con-
ditions appear to inhibit these networks, it was hypothesized that 
mind-wandering might constitute a DMN (Raichle et al., 2001). 
Initially, this formulation was controversial as it is not entirely clear 
what it might mean if laying in the scanner doing nothing was to 
be considered a “true baseline” for all cognitive tasks
20.
More methodologically, many researchers complained that due 
to the slow wave (<0.1 Hz, or about one cycle every 10 s) nature 
of resting-state connectivity, cardiovascular, and respiratory noise 
could not be excluded as causes of the apparent resting-state net-
works (RSNs). Given that initial RSN findings did not adequately 
control for these confounding variables, and the fact that it remains 
unclear exactly how the BOLD signal maps onto neural activity, many 
expressed doubt that these low-frequency fluctuations (LFFs) rep-
resented actual neural phenomenon with a functional counterpart. 
These concerns have since been largely dissuaded due to growing 
evidence that RSNs are not confounded by physiological noise and do 
in fact represent cross-culturally replicable21, robust phenomena of 
neurophysiological origin (Mantini et al., 2007; Van Dijk et al., 2010). 
Recent research has demonstrated that the slow-wave oscillations 
indexed in fMRI that characterize the DMN can be verified as neuro-
physiological deactivation during task performance via intracerebral 
EEG (Jerbi et al., 2010). Although it is still unclear exactly what role 
the RSNs play in cognition, memory, and perception, researchers have 
begun to converge around some common theories of DMN function.
Since Raichle’s early exposition of the DMN, most researchers have 
moved beyond describing the resting state as a “true baseline.” Raichle 
and Fox, two prominent researchers, have independently stated that 
20 See Morcom and Fletcher (2007) for a review of rational against the “baseline” 
hypothesis.
21 See “the human connectome project” (Biswal et al., 2010) for recent findings col-
lected from approximately 1,800 individuals across 32 international neuroimaging 
centers.
18http://www.frontiersin.org/consciousness_research/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00020/
full#B11
19http://www.frontiersin.org/consciousness_research/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00020/
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localization, denoting that these “task-induced” activities are in 
a fine-grained dynamic relationship with the ongoing slow-wave 
activity of the macroscopic brain networks. This is to say that, while 
certain kinds of reflective and online experience evoke “fast” neural 
activity, over time the pattern of these excitations leaves its mark 
upon the “slow” wave, altering how the network processes future 
information. Indeed task-evoked activity in the medial-frontal 
gyrus (MFG) during a visual face/place categorization task has 
been shown to predict subsequent MFG to occipital place areas (PA) 
low-frequency coupling. In this experiment, the degree of post-
task MFG–PA coupling significantly predicted post-scan memory 
performance (Stevens et al., 2010).
Experiments in animals and humans have revealed similar “rest-
stimulus” interactions in which the degree of task-evoked activity 
can be predicted by prior LFFs or vice versa (See Northoff et al., 
2010 for review). Thus, our gradual neuroplastic enculturation pre-
dicts reflective processing and our effortful attention to the environ-
ment. A great body of research has thus revealed that deactivations 
of the DMN are intrinsically anti-correlated with the CEN and SAL 
networks (Sridharan and Levitin, 2008; Carhart-Harris and Friston, 
2010). Setting aside considerations of the “defaultness” of the DMN, 
the finding of these distributed networks and their anti-correlation 
is immediately interesting for the neurophenomenology of both 
prereflective and reflective consciousness.
We contend that given the MPFC’s crucial role in social-  cognitive 
tasks, including social priming and desirability, the DMN is clearly 
highly susceptible to stimulation by means of ostensive social cues 
and social interaction (Schilbach et al., 2006) while also contributing 
to the reflective stream of conscious thought (Christoff et al., 2009). 
The MPFC and TPJ sub-nodes of the DMN have been repeatedly 
implicated in the processing of emotional faces, threat behavior, ToM 
cartoons, and other task involving the processing of social-cognitive 
cues (see Frith and Frith, 2007 for review). Given the dual role of 
the DMN in constraining exogenous neural activity and processing 
these cues, we hypothesize that the network is involved in both the 
reflective regulation of social behavior and the bottom-up processes 
that determine what is “salient” for the prereflective consciousness.
Although the actual detection of and pre-potent response to rapid 
salient cues is likely mediated and directly processed within the sali-
ence and CEN networks, as is the online control of behavior, we argue 
that it is the MPFC that sets the social “frame” for what is salient and 
preloads the repertoire of socially appropriate gestures and concepts 
needed in an online interaction. From a narrative perspective of folk-
psychology, this is akin to the interpretation of ones place as an agent 
within an unfolding interaction. Thus it is the role of DMN-supported 
self-rumination to evaluate and determine my place within a social 
hierarchy, to communicate what “set” or context I am to the SAL and 
CEN networks, and to play an active role in “writing” my own cur-
rent and future position within a social folk psychological narrative.
In  interaction,  my  ruminative  reflection  is  thus  extremely 
important for the regulation and evaluation of the unfolding scene; 
yet I must also be detached and authentic, fully automatic in my 
response. It is the smooth, sometimes anti-correlated interaction of 
the DMN with the SAL and CEN that enables our seamless interac-
tion with others, underpinning intersubjective behavioral learning 
(see Figure 1, below). Further, we argue that this highly embedded 
social-cognitive nature (Schilbach et al., 2008) and high neural 
the spatiotemporal coherence exhibited by spontaneous DMN activity 
is unlikely to reflect a baseline, but rather, is indicative of deep, almost 
architectural features of reflective consciousness. This “Mariana’s 
Trench” view of the DMN supports recent theories that relate hyper 
or hypoactivity connectivity within the network to thought disorders 
like schizophrenia and OCD. Thus it is not our claim that the DMN 
is the direct neural correlate of consciousness, as it is likely that the 
experiences of ruminative reflection and sensory–motor conscious-
ness do not reduce to these low-frequency oscillations. Further, sig-
nificant evidence of relatively developed (albeit significantly altered) 
DMN-like connectivity in the brains of pre-term infants (Fransson 
et al., 2007), and anesthetized adults (Greicius, 2008) lend credence 
to the pre-noetic view of DMN function. Rather, our claim is that 
it is the interaction of these networks with the “task-positive” envi-
ronment and history of the organism out of which social-cognitive 
consciousness arises. We thus predict that the functions of the DMN 
are crucial for the conscious integration of experience in self-narrative 
and interaction, setting the spatiotemporal and intersubjective asso-
ciations between experiences, both in terms of autobiographical and 
episodic memory and pre-potent prereflective tendencies. This map-
ping is further reflected by the distributed set of functions represented 
by individual nodes of the DMN.
The functions of the individual nodes of the DMN are many, but 
do appear to share a common, self-referential theme. Comprised 
primarily of the MPFC, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and areas 
of the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), these regions are implicated 
in theory-of-mind, belief-understanding, and episodic memory 
generation. In line with this hypothesis, a recent quantitative meta-
analysis of the DMN implicated the network in tasks involving 
autobiographical narrative, prospective memory, and theory-of-
mind (Spreng et al., 2009). A vast array of studies have now linked 
particular patterns of resting connectivity between these nodes and 
psychopathologies including ADHD, OCD, depression, and schizo-
phrenia, commonly construed as self-related reflective thought dis-
orders (Greicius, 2008). It has become clear from this research that 
an individual’s particular “connectomics” amongst default mode 
and other macroscopic neural networks is crucial for the function-
ing of bottom-up and top-down conscious processes.
Although a precise pattern has yet to emerge from these studies, 
a common theme throughout is hyper or hypoconnectivity of the 
DMN at rest, often correlated with measures of ruminative think-
ing, obsessive urges, or severity of symptoms and abnormalities in 
DMN deactivation during task-positive experimental conditions. 
It would thus appear that the “defaultness” of the DMN lies in its 
comprehensive involvement in tasks involving either the regulation 
of reflective thinking, the temporal structure of these thoughts, 
or their somatic references. It is our argument that this reflective, 
regular, and oftentimes unintentional narrative stream organizes 
experience into cohesive memories, facilitates action planning, and 
coordinates the joint action necessary for successful cognition and 
the ontogenetic development of consciousness.
Today, many researchers have moved beyond discussions center-
ing on the “default” conception, moving instead to the “resting-state 
network” terminology. This new paradigm highlights the impor-
tance of an individual’s “functional connectome” for the emergence 
of a particular consciousness (Buckner, 2010). The connectome 
approach emphasizes the relative contribution of a given functional www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 20  |  9
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plasticity of the DMN through development (Gogtay et al., 2004; 
Blakemore, 2008) highlights an important feature of the human 
cognitive-executive-salience system: social interaction and encul-
turation are central motivators of plastic brain adaptation.
plastIcIty: crucIal for socIocultural conscIousness
The brain is an evolving, dynamic system. Human brains have often 
been described as proportionally larger than those of our simian 
counterparts. Recent research, however, appears to overturn this 
claim: the human neocortex is not larger than that of chimpan-
zees when body-size is controlled for. Comparative studies find 
that prefrontal white matter alone differentiates apes and humans 
(Schoenemann et al., 2005). White matter is highly plastic, with 
myelination increases occurring within as few as 11 h of body-
awareness training (Tang et al., 2010) and remains highly variable 
throughout development (Blakemore, 2008) and the lifespan22. 
Finally, local connective tissue appears to possess the greatest level 
of plasticity, with mappings between synaptic terminals potentially 
undergoing complete remodeling in as few as 4 weeks (Stettler 
et al., 2006).
As  cortical  neuroplasticity  in  healthy  human  adults  gradually 
begins to gain widespread acceptance in the scientific community23, 
we have begun to realize that a wide variety of psychopathologies can be 
described in terms of their impact on cortical connectivity. Through the 
newly developed methods of diffusion-tensor imaging and functional 
connectivity analysis, diseases that previously resisted neuroimaging 
classification have begun to reveal the complex way in which the human 
connectome shapes cognition. To give a simple example, imagine the 
physiology of focal stress. Given recent connectivity research, the experi-
ence of a stressful event can no longer be described as a focal disorder 
of, for example, stimulus processing, or ruminative thoughts. This is 
precisely because stress is not localized to any single region or function of 
the brain. Indeed, the neural stress response supervenes on a distributed 
system including multiple brain areas, the body, social roles, and the 
hormone system. The experience of social and mental stress depends 
upon both the sociocultural history of the actor and the subsequent 
entrainment of an agent’s macroscopic resting networks.
FIGuRe 1 | Diagram of resting-state network mappings to prereflective and 
reflective consciousness. Arrows represent interactions between networks. 
DMN includes medial-prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, the 
inferior parietal lobule, the lateral and inferior temporal cortex, and the medial 
temporal lobes. CEN includes dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, frontal eye fields, 
dorsal medial-prefrontal cortex, intraparietal sulcus, and superior parietal lobule. 
The Saliency Network (SAL) includes the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, 
frontoinsular cortices, amygdala, and ventral midbrain.
22 It is worth noting here, though we will not explore the issue further in this paper, 
that plasticity can be sub-divided into mechanisms corresponding to effortful lear-
ning (active) and those associated with recovery from damage or maturation (pas-
sive). Here we shall refer to both as “plasticity” and discuss a variety of mechanisms 
related to both sub-divisions.
23  See Rubin (2009) for an excellent historical review of neurogenesis and plasticity.Frontiers in Psychology  | Consciousness Research    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 20  |  10
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Follow up studies conducted at multiple sites further establish 
white matter increases throughout the frontal and parietal corti-
ces, coupled with regionally specific increases and/or decreases in 
gray matter throughout adolescence (Blakemore, 2008). The MPFC 
undergoes significant changes throughout adolescence, demon-
strating altered response to faces and social cues (Blakemore, 2008). 
Studies of the default mode reveal that although LFF networks can 
be found even at birth (Fransson et al., 2007) and although they 
are generally well connected between hemispheres, they remain 
sparsely  interconnected  throughout  childhood  and  into  early 
adolescence, gaining maximum connectivity during early adult 
hood before declining again through late development (Fair et al., 
2008). Within elderly populations, differences in DMN structure 
and function differentiate those with mild Alzheimer’s from healthy 
age-matched controls (Greicius et al., 2004).
shIftIng netWorks and IndIvIdual dIfferences
As argued previously, if we want to maximize our explanatory 
power, then reflective consciousness must be distinguished from 
prereflective consciousness. We thus argue for a view of conscious-
ness as the embodied, ontogenetic development of balanced inter-
actions between exteroceptive targeted sensory–motor processes 
and  interoceptive  mental  representational  and  cultural  forces 
that are particular to individuals and their sociocognitive history. 
This distinction is supported by the organization of the brain into 
endogenously anti-correlated neurological networks for exogenous 
and endogenous processing, as well as their particular interactions 
and tendency toward plastic adaptation to the social environ.
What does it mean for neural networks to be endogenously 
anti-correlated? Although the exact nature of LFF anti-correlations 
remains unclear, recent experiments have demonstrated both that 
natural anti-correlations (i.e., systematic complementary deactiva-
tions and activations between RSNs) have a neural underpinning 
(Jerbi et al., 2010) and are consistently predicted by task-difficulty 
and stimulus demands. However, other fMRI research on experi-
ence sampling during sustained attention and introspection tasks 
(Christoff et al., 2009) reveals that “pure anti-correlation” is less 
likely than the task and context-dependent distribution of these 
network’s activity, in that these networks are probably not strictly 
antagonistic, but rather are distributed in their allocation depend-
ing on task and context. Thus in some cases the DMN and CEN 
may exhibit clear anti-correlation (for example during extremely 
attention-demanding tasks) whereas for various types of social-
cognitive or introspective tasks, the DMN may actually coactivate 
with the CEN or SAL networks depending on task demands.
Given the particularly dynamic and individual nature of these 
networks, we hypothesize that human consciousness is crucially 
dependent upon an individual’s particular balance of intrinsic and 
extrinsic brain networks. We do not concede that consciousness 
is reducible or localizable with these networks, but rather exists 
only when actively coupled with an individual’s sociolinguistic and 
ontogenetic history. Both prereflective and reflective conscious-
nesses are, on our account, multiply realizable and constrained by 
individual differences. The natural plasticity and functional adapt-
ability of both brains and human social networks support this view. 
We are not born “ready-to-go,” but rather, must undergo specialized 
socially interactive brain training in order to fulfill the massive 
What evidence is there regarding the kind of radical neurocon-
nective plasticity we are arguing for? By radical neuroconnectivity, 
we refer to fast adaptations at the cellular, molecular, functional, or 
anatomical level in response to training and experience. We do not 
deny that much of neural development is shared across cultures and 
persons; ceteris paribus two individuals will typically develop nearly 
identical gross neural anatomy
24. Yet, the connective plasticity of 
the brain is so radically dynamic, that primary sensory cortices can 
“take-over” one another given damage (Bavelier and Neville, 2002) 
or reverse function to incorporate a 180° flip in vision (Shimojo and 
Nakajima, 1981). Cutting edge neurobiological imaging technolo-
gies have now revealed synaptic button turn-over rates of close to 
7% per week (Stettler et al., 2006). If this rate holds constant across 
the axon, the entire synaptic-connective model of a given neural 
pathway could be remodeled within 3–4 weeks! As little as 4 h of 
high frequency trans-cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the 
auditory cortex caused significant thickening of the auditory cortex, 
both ipsi and contralateral to the sight of the stimulation (May et al., 
2007). This thickening, correlated with increased performance on an 
auditory discrimination task, vanishes 3 days without stimulation.
More recently, research by Tang et al. (2010) reveals that as little 
as 11 h of body-focused meditation results in significantly increased 
fractional anisotropy25 (FA) of anterior cingulate connective path-
ways, a critical pathway for interaction between CEN and SAL net-
work functions such as behavioral inhibition and action selection. 
Finally, voxel-based morphometry before and after medical school 
exams reveals increased neural density in hippocampal learning-
associated areas (Draganski et al., 2006), and 3 weeks of Tetris train-
ing in young girls revealed functional and structural differences in 
working memory and spatial processing areas (Haier et al., 2009). 
Given that working memory and spatial processing are clear pre-
dictors of successful language and career learning, and given the 
implicit impact of executive function networks upon the DMN and 
vice versa, a mere 3 weeks learning to play Tetris is clearly enough to 
improve communication between the strategic and sensory–motor 
elements common to the game. Clearly the brain adapts to its train-
ing, but to what degree is this effect realized in the social-cognitive 
and default mode areas? Do the rigorously ritualistic group-actions 
we engage in produce systematic alterations in brain structure?
In a landmark study, Gogtay et al. (2004) constructed “movies” 
of pediatric brain development through the use of MRI repeated 
every 2 years on 13 healthy children, aged 4–21, over a period of 
8–10 years. Analysis of gray matter density changes across the whole 
brain revealed a striking pattern of neural pruning, with primary 
association areas being the first to mature, followed by secondary 
association, frontal, temporal, orbitofrontal, and dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex. It is interesting to note that social-cognition associ-
ated areas reached maturity prior to classical executive function areas 
(e.g., DLPFC, rACC) suggesting that these more metacognitive func-
tions may rely on the establishment of social-cognitive mechanisms.
24Although do note that how “nearly identical” gross neural morphology is between 
subjects and populations is a primary assumption in many imaging analysis tech-
niques (Friston et al., 1994) and is a topic of heated debate, including evidence that 
over-prevalent “WEIRD” sampling in neuroimaging has led to a systematic bias in 
results due to the exclusion of Asian and African-American participants in many 
studies (Isamah et al., 2010).
25 A measure of white matter integrity related to axonal myelination.www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 20  |  11
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rituals is in fact aimed at training the interaction and tempo of 
interaction between the prereflective sensorimotor and reflective-
narrative systems. Successful parenting means that a child will not 
need to remember to brush her teeth; rather she will automatically 
do so every night at a given time.
That is to say, regardless of if she is reflectively conscious of 
needing to brush her teeth, if she goes long-enough without doing 
it, her prereflective salience network will at some point trigger the 
default mode related action-controlling ruminative thought, “I 
should really get on with brushing my teeth”27. Although skill learn-
ing likely begins with the recitation of ritualized action narratives, 
embodied practice ensures that in time the individual no longer 
needs to maintain top-down control. Conversely, over time one may 
gain sufficient metacognitive experience to listen to the body and 
determine that one has made some ill mistake, perhaps forgotten 
to turn the teakettle down. The ability to translate intuitive “gut” 
feelings into meaningful, reliable decisions requires both a keen 
introspective practice and a sufficiently well developed self-theory-
of-mind. Thus we do not always listen to the cues of our bodies, 
instead repeating mistakes again and again. This is a kind of delicate 
balance between our sensory–motor and reflective consciousness, 
as the two are in a constant reciprocal connection.
If consciousness is related to sensory–motor history, one could ask 
how they differ from one another in consciousness. How does any 
one individual differ from, for example a female, an older person, a 
nun, a juggler, etc.? The answer lies within both the prereflective and 
reflective consciousness. Prereflectively, these individuals will have 
different potentials for action; reflectively, they will have subtly differ-
ent self-metaphors. The juggler may notice his every move, while the 
nun feels that she is a direct extension of God, with little awareness 
of her body. A woman may be more or less likely to assert herself 
depending on the permissiveness of her local culture. Reflectively, 
the older person will experience herself and her world through the 
lens of a fundamentally different viewpoint from that of the child, 
perhaps with the knowledge of long months spent in a war trench, or 
the exoneration of a successful business venture. It is not the case that 
we differ merely in memory or the contents of consciousness, as these 
elements are intricately interwoven into the conscious experience of 
the individual, preconfiguring our perception of the world.
We  contend  further  that  social  interaction  plays  a  specific 
mechanistic role in the development of self-narrative and action-
control. At one level, the constant reminders from a mother to 
her child seek to control his attention and teach new skills. The 
human prefrontal cortex is extremely sensitive to cues from oth-
ers. Recent meta-analysis found that “threat to social identity” and 
“loss of social control” was the greatest elicitors of hypothalamic–
pituitary–amygdala  cortisol  secretion  (Dickerson  and  Kemeny, 
2004). Cortisol leads to hyper-activation of the prefrontal cortex 
and repeated stress-induced cortisol exposure results in thinning 
of prefrontal density and fronto-amygdalar connectivity. This is, of 
course, only one among many similar mechanisms and hormones 
that are sensitive to social interaction and influence development; 
there are critical periods such as the spurt in theory-of-mind devel-
opment between ages 3 and 4 and it seems certain that everything 
from a mother’s congratulating smile to video games and school 
  distribution of niche-specializations that is unique to contempo-
rary society. A growing body of evidence highlights a primary role 
for social interaction in health and brain development (Dickerson 
and Kemeny, 2004; Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010). To further elucidate 
the relationship between prereflective and reflective consciousness 
in terms of RSNs, consider the following examples.
Any  given  individual’s  morphogenetic  history  will  be  fun-
damentally shaped by both interaction with others and genetic 
inheritance. Interaction serves multiple neurologically formative 
purposes: the imitation of motor behaviors, the recitation of heu-
ristic habitual behaviors, and the linguistic navigation of social 
encounters. Human behavior is characterized by a fundamental 
reliance on highly ritualized skills that are essentially designed to 
adapt the brain to any given environmental niche. Thus, contem-
porary society demands that children must be repetitively taught 
to brush their teeth, pick up after themselves, make their beds, eat 
well, be nice to others, adhere to appropriate gender norms, and 
other traits of polite society. In adolescence we require initiation 
ceremonies, participation in sports and group activity, exercise of 
the body, courtship behaviors, ritualized practice of mathematical 
and scientific reasoning, and so on.
It is this rich intersubjective history that allows us to make 
meaningful choices, deciding to shape our lives through the grad-
ual enculturation of our malleable neural cortex. Yet this plasticity 
also has a consequence: the socioeconomic factors and small non-
conscious habits we ritualistically ascribe to (e.g., “I don’t know 
why, I just don’t enjoy X without Y”) have lasting consequences on 
our future possibilities for action. The choices we make may not 
be “free,” yet they are highly consequential for our development 
and are grounded in our social lives. Thus the most important 
choices in life do not revolve around the decision to brush ones’ 
teeth or take a meal; these things are entrained such that the truly 
important (and fundamentally social) decisions, like becoming 
vegetarian or pursuing a new career far from home come into 
focus, both in our cultural practices and most cherished memo-
ries. Throughout adulthood we require the training of a highly 
specialized set of ritual behaviors and speech patterns, whether 
those be preparing sales reports or flipping burgers. The social 
developmental of functional units of behavior is fundamentally 
geared toward creating particular types of brains. As John Protevi 
puts it, “subjectivity [is] an emergent capacity of bodies when they 
are placed in the appropriate subjectification practices” (Protevi, 
2009, p. 31).
A common refusal here might be to say that all of these behav-
iors require the mere learning of scripts, and do not need to 
invoke neuroplasticity beyond that required for the development 
of a functioning language module. This view fails on two counts. 
Given that activities like studying for exams, learning to juggle, 
playing a videogame, or learning to meditate all induce structural 
and functional brain alterations across a wide variety of cognitive–
sensory domains
26, it seems unlikely that developmental plasticity 
is entrained solely within linguistic learning modules. Second, the 
goal of sociocultural training is not in fact the reflective represen-
tation or meta-conscious analysis of a given task-set. Rather, the 
training to brush ones’ teeth, drive to work, or perform courtship 
27 Or perhaps a simple “stare” or gaze from the mother will motivate this behavior. 26 See Draganski and May (2008) for a review of these and similar findings.Frontiers in Psychology  | Consciousness Research    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 20  |  12
Allen and Williams  Consciousness, plasticity, and connectomics
  consciousness, determining what is passed from salience, to reflec-
tive rumination, to pre-potent action control. Through specific 
patterns of neural entrainment, recitation of these ritualized themes 
brings about alterations in connectivity in these resting networks 
and alters task-elicited functional specializations (Northoff et al., 
2010). In this way the gradual build-up of experience is synthesized 
in a subjective format and stored for future recollection.
Thus over time the specific sociocultural niche, including soci-
oeconomic factors, access to quality education, parenting style, 
and even local pollutants (Chen and Schwartz, 2009) contribute 
to the precise individual balance of these networks. In short, we 
suggest that sociocultural learning entrains the “what” and “how” 
of information transfer between the DMN, Salience, and Control 
networks. Through repetition (reflective and otherwise) certain 
themes are entrained within the DMN. That is to say, the specif-
ics of ones’ cultural context become a constant theme within the 
overall autobiographical narrative. In this way the reflective con-
sciousness is linked to the particulars of one’s culture, and will be 
shared or different between cultures depending upon the degree 
of overlap between them. The sensory–motor consciousness (and 
neural substrate), while highly plastic through early development 
and capable of recovery in response to injury, ultimately produces 
an extremely similar outcome regardless of ones’ locale.
The greatest area for difference, then, is the particular inter-
action of the automatic and reflective networks, i.e., those areas 
where small differences in gesture can have a vast impact on a 
group, or where careful reflective attention is absolutely necessary 
for ultimate sensory–motor control. Thus, the information that is 
available to the salience and CEN networks (e.g., what appears in 
visual consciousness, and the action-systems repertoire of accept-
able pre-potent’ responses), will be modulated by whatever social 
set, context, or role is being primed by the social-cognitive default 
network. These are in turn set about by the developmental trajec-
tory of the interactive agent.
are metacognItIon and socIal cognItIon traInable 
“skIlls”?
Here is an obvious truism: some people are better at social cog-
nition than others. Politicians, lawyers, secret service agents, and 
other trained professionals depend upon highly sharpened belief–
desire prediction models. Academics in the humanities must spin 
long, extremely complicated and obtuse narratives entertaining 
hundreds  if  not  thousands  of  years  of  sociocultural  develop-
ment. And yet, throughout the social-cognitive neurosciences, 
there  exists  almost  no  objective  measures  of  social-cognitive 
competence. This has made the exploration of plasticity within 
the medial-prefrontal node of the default mode somewhat more 
difficult, as there exists no metric by which to evaluate training-
related social-cognitive gains. However, in the face of a lack of 
direct evidence, we can conclude from several sources that these 
processes are also highly plastic, both intrinsically and in relation 
to the salience and control networks.
First,  developmentally  speaking,  the  medial-prefrontal  and 
temporoparietal  regions  are  among  the  very  last  to  reach  full 
developmental maturity (Gogtay et al., 2004) with neural devel-
opment in the human neocortex being marked by massive Hebbian 
reinforcement (white matter and synaptic connectivity increases) 
sports will have an impact on neural development across the brain. 
Still, we believe there is sufficient evidence of the central importance 
of intersubjectivity in infant cognitive development. For example, 
infants are highly responsive to social cues at an early age (Senju 
and Csibra, 2008), and even new-born twins demonstrate coor-
dinated, coupled social interaction (Castiello et al., 2010). Clearly 
the brain is equipped from the very beginning to learn about the 
world from others.
Given the extreme plasticity of the social-cognitive and execu-
tive prefrontal networks in the first two decades of life, we contend 
that interactive and social-cognitive mechanisms play a crucial role 
in the development of consciousness. It is thus not our claim that 
social–cortisol response is the only mechanism of plastic adapta-
tion, but rather, one (highly important) mechanism for the kind 
of sociocultural adaptation under discussion. For the purpose of 
length, we have not discussed other equally important milestones 
in the development of (for example) language and motor function, 
yet these also are likely to depend upon intersubjective plasticity 
mechanisms to some degree. For this paper, we restrict our review to 
related mechanisms of systematic anti-correlation between RSNs.
Another piece of evidence for the DMN’s susceptibility toward 
interaction-induced plasticity inducing comes from recent research 
by Schilbach et al. (2006), demonstrating that a non-cognitive, 
interactive joint-attention task with virtual avatars actually acti-
vates DMN areas while deactivating action-salience systems. Thus 
what is actually “task-positive” may depend upon the social context 
within which it occurs; if I am to process an engaging, dynamic, 
interactive person than my DMN could be quite important for that 
interaction. On the other hand, if my task is to respond rapidly and 
accurately to eyeball distractors, the DMN might simply get in the 
way of this “social” task.
We can now take these analyses and combine them. The DMN 
exhibits task-free, slow-wave, spontaneous activity that is associated 
with narrative processing, self-relatedness, reflective consciousness, 
and ruminative thinking. This association is not strictly conscious; the 
DMN retains coherence under anesthesia
28 (Peltier et al., 2005; Raichle 
and Snyder, 2007; Greicius et al., 2008), while connectivity of the DMN 
remains in locked-in (but not “brain dead”) patients (Boly et al., 2009; 
Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010). However, DMN activity does correlate 
with individual differences and deactivations relate to specific psycho-
pathological traits and personality measures (Sheng et al., 2010).
Furthermore, Lewis et al. (2009) have demonstrated that learn-
ing on a visual–motor task, predicts alterations in frontoparietal and 
visual cortex resting connectivity. We thus propose that the DMN 
grounds the sometimes-reflective iterative rehearsal of social, self, 
and action narratives. More globally, the resting-connectome forms 
a crucial part of the pre-noetic structure29 of our sensorimotor 
28 At first glance this finding may seem contradictory with our hypothesis regar-
ding the involvement of DMN activity in reflective consciousness. That the DMN 
remains intrinsically coupled during total anesthesia indicates only however that 
the function of the network is highly automatic. Research in this area indicates the 
differential dosages of anesthesia induce differential degrees of deactivation and 
decoupled activity in the DMN. It is our account that DMN in interaction with 
frontoparietal action-salience systems that underlies consciousness.
29 Literally, “before consciousness,” e.g., that which structures but is not present 
  within consciousness (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). What is pre-noetic for con-
sciousness? The body, culture, and the neural connectome are all relevant examples.www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 20  |  13
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  constructs we denote as mental are in shifting, interrelated posi-
tions. Thus, although we discuss anti-correlations and their impli-
cations for the reflective/prereflective dimension, it is important 
to note that the “whole story” is likely to be far less clean than this 
distinction implies.
We are certainly not alone in surmising that the anti-correlation 
finding minimally suggests a unique form of informational interac-
tion between the action-oriented salience/control and social-cogni-
tive domains (see Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010). However, basic 
phenomenology here reveals a few caveats. It is not the case that in 
prereflective interaction I am no longer able to engage in detached, 
metarepresentational processing. Nor is it fully the case that in 
my detached navel-gazing I am shielded from the sensory–motor 
fluctuation of my body in its environment. Rather, in both cases 
there exists a fine tuned spatiotemporal distribution of processing 
and resource allocation between these functional domains.
To illustrate, consider the classical example of “cocktail party 
coping.” To clarify and keep this example quite familiar, let us say 
the party in question is a post-conference dinner. I, the subject 
in question, having just entered the room, am immediately pre-
sented with the multitude of faces, voices, and explorative eyeball 
saccades that fixate in wild fluctuation across the room. Further 
constraining my interaction are the intersubjective power narra-
tives that hang like spectral ether across the room; the “who’s whos” 
and veritas of any social gathering. Entering into conversation, I 
must not only attend to the complex linguistic content of my new 
dyad, but also the randomly wavering eye-gazes, body postures, 
and other embodied semantic content determining the mood of 
the room. Should I continue speaking, or perhaps take my place 
at the dinner table? Has my conversational partner become bored, 
or should I continue our discussion? As we interact, I must con-
tinuously update the narrative coming from my mouth and my 
memory with the information given back to me by my partner. This 
process will be continually structured by salient target information 
as well as cultural representational values and is likely to only be 
minimally “conscious” in the traditional (i.e., intentional, reflective, 
self-identical) sense of the term.
Consider further the relationship between power narrative and 
embodied dynamics that unfold in this particular scene. Surely I am 
not constantly meta-conscious of the continuously unfolding social 
dynamics. To be so would be almost schizophrenic, and certainly I 
might suffer social-anxiety should I try to iteratively track all these 
possible variables. Rather, in line with the reputation costs associated 
with embodied social behavior, I simply act. I respond automatically 
to belief states, embodied gestures, and a host of constantly unfold-
ing social-cognitive dynamics. My eyes and face must automatically 
track my partner’s, lest I fail in engaging the chameleon effects that 
seem so crucial for smooth interpersonal interaction. Clearly we 
have a situation where my narrative processing is automatically guid-
ing my tracking of salient social cues, and also in the inhibition of 
action: the social-narrative stream pouring forth from my mouth is 
consistently inhibited. Simply put, the power-dynamics of my social 
context are modulating both my behavior (compare ones’ posture 
in a work setting to that of a bar or amongst close friends) and my 
default speech. If I am to be socially successful, I will inhibit what-
ever dirty jokes I might tell otherwise. Human social interaction is 
completely pervaded by these information intensive interchanges 
and neural pruning (gray matter decreases). As neural maturity is 
achieved via “back to front” development, the neural substrates of 
theory-of-mind (e.g., MPFC, TPJ, etc) remain open to experiential 
plasticity and training well into early adulthood (see Blakemore 
and Choudhury 2006). As we have argued, a primary causal locus 
for the development of consciousness is the small-group ritualiza-
tion and enculturation of young brains. Although we are in some 
sense born with the sensorimotoric equivalent of our early homi-
nid ancestors, we must rapidly entrain ourselves within the highly 
complex and interwoven social-narrative tapestries that regulate 
action and prescribe behavior across nested spatiotemporal scales.
Before moving on, we need to briefly mention the notion of tem-
poral receptivity. The given plasticity of a cognitive circuit should at 
least in part depend upon its window of temporal receptivity. That 
is to say, it does not make much sense for my social-narrative brain 
system to be sensitive to the fine tuned sensory–motor dynamics 
that entrain action-oriented networks. Simply put, blindfolding a 
participant for an hour of perceptual-motor training should not 
directly create neuroplastic adaptation in the medial-prefrontal 
network. Rather, these adaptations are likely to be localized to the 
high-speed window of the visual–motor system. Indeed, recent 
research suggests a differential topography of temporal receptive 
windows throughout the human neocortex: areas associated with 
reflective cognition tend to have much slower windows (3–36 s and 
upward) whereas visual cortex responds to information at higher 
frequency (<1 s; Hasson et al., 2008). We suggest that the greater 
temporal period of the temporoparietal junction and MPFC cor-
respond more directly to the frequency of slow-wave behavioral–
narrative interaction.
Take, for example, a conference dinner. We can here identify 
multiple temporal scales for relevant information processing. The 
fast-wave phenomenon like group shifts, behavioral chameleon 
phenomenon, and embodied mirroring occur far too fast to be 
tracked  exhaustively  by  the  reflective  representational  system. 
Rather, it is only the slowly aggregated summation of these events 
that enter into my narratological, metarepresentational processing, 
which is itself constrained by the acoustic temporal dynamics and 
rhythms of spoken interaction. Spiraling this concept outward, 
we can deduce that narrative processing also includes many slow-
wave phenomena, entailing high-speed tasks such as the online 
identification of misplaced utterances, but also incorporating the 
gradual updating of self and social narratives. It is not the case that 
I rapidly and constantly update my self-narrative; rather it is only 
the aggregate sum of significant interactive events that eventually 
enters into my narrative. Thus it is the sum of my social interactions 
that engineer particular types of consciousness through the gross 
plasticity of our neural system. Our hypothesis is that this gradual 
integration of experience, led by social engagement with the world, 
is entrained by the default mode and in turns structures the phe-
nomenal salience of both prereflective and reflective perception.
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D. It is the vast connective plasticity of the human frontoparietal 
cortex that enables the rapid development and acquisition of 
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There are of course some worries generated by our account. 
One initial worry might be that we have “over intellectualized” 
consciousness and lost sight of the original explanandum of 
“what-it-is-like” to be an organism. However, although philo-
sophical accounts of consciousness as pure phenomenal sub-
jectivity might be initially appealing, we have argued that they 
are insufficient to account for the rich narratological capacities 
of contemporary human consciousness and fail to capture what 
makes us uniquely human. Accordingly, we avoid the theoretical 
pitfall of denying phenomenal states to non-human organisms 
while still retaining a robust sense of consciousness that goes 
beyond embodied sensorimotor experience. Such an account 
is desirable precisely because it can do justice to the subjec-
tivity of animals while acknowledging the unique cultural–
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of narrative and embodied coping (Gallagher and Hutto, 2008). 
Pure anti-correlation cannot obtain. Rather, my executive-control 
systems and visual salience networks must be in constant reciprocal 
communication with my social-representational-moral DMN.
conclusIon
As is often the case in the cognitive sciences, we have tried to demon-
strate that there are multiple areas of critical overlap between a variety 
of currently disparate research trends. We have reviewed new research 
findings and theoretical developments in neuroplasticity, cognitive 
neuroscience, development, joint action and social cognition, phe-
nomenology, and the philosophical investigation of consciousness. As 
a definitive integration of these areas is obviously beyond the scope 
of the present paper, we present these findings in hopes of convinc-
ing the reader that there is a crucial role for social interaction and 
plasticity in the ontogeny of human consciousness.
Our account motivates several conclusions. First, an explana-
tion of human consciousness is not primarily a matter of explain-
ing pure phenomenal feels. This is not to deny the importance of 
phenomenal feels for grounding our experience as living, embodied 
organisms. Rather, we have argued that to fully explain conscious-
ness is to also give an account of the unique capacity for metacogni-
tion and metarepresentation demonstrated through what has been 
called offline intelligence. We have argued that a mature science of 
consciousness must be careful in avoiding the conflation of online 
intelligence with offline intelligence. Second, a mature explanation 
of the human mind must take into account the radical multisensory 
plasticity underlying both online and offline intelligence.
Further than just integration, we have hoped to advance an 
account that places the DMN, and the larger paradigm of human 
connectomics, as a central mechanism for the development of con-
sciousness. We have thus proposed the following:
A. Human  consciousness  depends  upon  the  ruminative,  self-
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